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SEARCHING FOR “SOMETHING MORE”: 
VIACOM INTERPRETS THE CONTROL 
PROVISION OF THE DMCA § 512(c)  
SAFE HARBOR 
Abstract: On April 5, 2012, in Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(c)(1)(B) requires a service provider to exert “substantial influence” 
over user activity to show the requisite control necessary to remove it 
from safe harbor protection. In doing so, the Second Circuit created a 
circuit split with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding 
the proper interpretation of the § 512(c)(1)(B) control provision. This 
Comment argues that, unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit ren-
dered the statute internally consistent by giving effect to all of § 512(c)’s 
language. It further contends that the Second Circuit’s holding in Viacom 
is consistent with the broad policy goals behind Congress’s passage of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 and enactment of safe harbor 
protection for service providers. 
Introduction 
 Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
(DMCA) in an attempt to keep pace with emerging web technology by 
bringing U.S. copyright law into the digital age.1 Title II of the DMCA, 
separately titled the Online Copyright Infringement Limitation Liabil-
ity Act (“OCILLA”), tried to incentivize cooperation between online 
service providers and copyright owners to detect and address digital 
copyright infringement.2 OCILLA aimed to provide certainty for both 
copyright owners and service providers by clarifying the liability faced 
by service providers who transmit potentially infringing material over 
their networks.3 Congress feared that service providers’ everyday opera-
tions could potentially expose them to massive infringement liability.4 
                                                                                                                      
1 S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 1–2 (1998). 
2 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 
F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2012); H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49 (1998); S. Rep. No. 105-190, 
at 20, 40. A ‘service provider’ is defined as a provider of online services or network access, 
or an operator of those facilities. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B). 
3 H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49–50; S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 2, 20, 40. 
4 See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8. 
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Rather than undertake a wholesale clarification of existing copyright 
liability doctrines,5 Congress chose to create a series of four “safe har-
bors” for certain common activities of qualifying service providers to 
protect the providers from monetary liability for direct, vicarious, and 
contributory infringement.6 
 One of the four safe harbors, § 512(c), limits service provider lia-
bility for copyright-infringing material that resides on systems or net-
works at the direction of users.7 One provision of § 512(c)—the 
§ 512(c)(1)(B) control provision—removes a service provider from 
                                                                                                                      
5 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 27; S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 19. The Senate Report accompanying 
the DMCA noted that several pre-DMCA cases relevant to service provider liability had 
analyzed the issue from the standpoint of contributory and vicarious liability. See S. Rep. 
No. 105-190, at 19. 
6 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 27; H.R. Rep. No. 105-796, at 73 (1998) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 
1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 639, 649; H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 50; S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 19–
20; see Justin Hughes, The Internet and the Persistence of Law, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 359, 385 (2003). 
To qualify for safe harbor protection, a service provider must first meet a set of threshold 
criteria. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 27. In the 2012 case, Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 
the Second Circuit identified the threshold criteria as: (1) establishing that they are in fact 
a service provider (§ 512(k)(1)(B)); (2) adopting and implementing a “repeat infringer” 
policy (§ 512(i)(1)(A)); and (3) accommodating “standard technical measures” used by 
copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works (§ 512(i)(1)(B), (i)(2)). Id.; see 
17 U.S.C. § 512(i), (k). Once those criteria are met, the service provider then must satisfy 
the specific provisions of a particular safe harbor. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 27; see 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(a)–(d). The Online Copyright Infringement Limitation Liability Act (“OCILLA”) 
created four safe harbors for various types of service providers: (a) “transitory digital net-
work communications”; (b) “system caching”; (c) “information residing on systems or 
networks at [the] direction of users”; and (d) “information location tools.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(a)–(d); Viacom, 676 F.3d at 27. 
7 17 U.S.C. § 512(c); Viacom, 676 F.3d at 25, 27. The § 512(c) safe harbor applies only 
if the service provider: 
(1) . . . (A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material . . . on the sys-
tem or network is infringing; 
 (ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or cir-
cumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
 (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to 
remove, or disable access to, the material; 
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing 
activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to con-
trol such activity; and 
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement . . . responds expeditiously to 
remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to 
be the subject of infringing activity. 
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)–(C). Section 512(c) also sets forth a detailed notification scheme 
that requires service providers to “designate[] an agent to receive notifications of claimed 
infringement.” Viacom, 676 F.3d at 27; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2). Finally, § 512(c) specifies 
the components of a proper notification to the agent, commonly referred to as a 
“takedown notice.” Viacom, 676 F.3d at 27; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3). 
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safe harbor protection if that provider has “the right and ability to con-
trol” infringing material placed on its website by users.8 
 In April 2012, in Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., a panel 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted the 
§ 512(c)(1)(B) control provision to require “something more” than the 
service provider’s mere ability to remove or block access to materials 
posted on its site.9 Specifically, the service provider would need to “ex-
ert[] substantial influence” on its users’ activities to show the requisite 
control to remove itself from safe harbor protection.10 This interpreta-
tion created a circuit split with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit’s 2011 decision in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners 
LLC.11 
 This Comment evaluates the Second Circuit’s interpretation in 
Viacom of the “something more” that would satisfy the § 512(c)(1)(B) 
control provision and potentially remove a service provider from safe 
harbor protection.12 Part I outlines the facts and procedural history of 
Viacom.13 Part II discusses the circuit split created by the Second and 
Ninth Circuits’ conflicting interpretations of the § 512(c)(1)(B) con-
trol provision.14 Finally, Part III argues that the Second Circuit’s deci-
sion in Viacom correctly avoided making § 512(c)(1)(B) a superfluous 
statutory provision and resulted in an internally consistent reading of 
§ 512(c).15 It also argues that the Viacom decision furthers the policies 
behind the DMCA and allows service providers to structure their activi-
ties to ensure they maintain safe harbor protection.16 
                                                                                                                      
8 S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 44; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B); Viacom, 676 F.3d at 36. Section 
512(c) only applies if a service provider meets all of its provisions, and thus, the section lays 
out the various ways in which a service provider can lose protection from liability. See Viacom, 
676 F.3d at 27. One way for a service provider to lose liability protection is if it receives a fi-
nancial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity in a case in which it has “the right 
and ability to control such activity.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). This Comment 
refers to § 512(c)(1)(B)’s “right and ability to control” language as “the § 512(c)(1)(B) con-
trol provision.” See infra notes 9–76 and accompanying text. 
9 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 19, 26, 30–41. 
10 Id. at 36–38. 
11 See id. at 36; UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 
1042–43 (9th Cir. 2011). 
12 See infra notes 58–76 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 17–34 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 35–57 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 58–76 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 58–76 and accompanying text. 
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I. The Second Circuit’s Decision in Viacom 
 Founded in 2005, YouTube is a consumer media company that 
allows people to share original videos over the Internet.17 YouTube en-
ables users to upload short video clips that its computer systems auto-
matically process and store.18 Other users can then watch the videos 
free of charge.19 YouTube, not unlike many platforms dedicated to us-
er-generated content, not only facilitated an increase in creativity and 
originality, but also served as an outlet for users to post pirated materi-
als, often without the permission of copyright owners.20 
 In March 2007, Viacom, an American media conglomerate, along-
side various affiliates, filed suit against YouTube in the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York.21 In May 2007, Premier 
League, an English soccer league, and Bourne Co., a music publisher, 
filed a putative class action against YouTube in the same court.22 The 
district judge for the Viacom case was assigned the Premier League class 
                                                                                                                      
17 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 28; About YouTube, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/t/about_ 
youtube (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). Under the slogan “Broadcast Yourself,” YouTube be-
came one of the most popular and influential entities of the “Web 2.0” movement—networks 
consisting of websites and service providers focused on user-generated content (“UGC”) and 
participation. See Lital Helman & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Best Available Technology Stand-
ard, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1194, 1195 & n.1 (2011) (providing examples of UGC sites and ser-
vices—including video-sharing sites); About YouTube, supra. YouTube’s initial notoriety, profit-
ability, and popularity grew at an astronomical rate, and by the summer of 2006 it was the 
fastest growing website in terms of visitor traffic. Gavin O’Malley, YouTube Is the Fastest Growing 
Website, AdAge Digital ( July 21, 2006), http://adage.com/article/digital/youtube-fastest-
growing-website/110632/. In November 2006, Google purchased YouTube for $1.65 billion. 
Viacom, 676 F.3d at 28. YouTube continued to grow, and by May 2010 users uploaded twenty-
four hours of video per minute and watched more than two billion videos per day. About 
YouTube, supra. 
18 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 28. Users can upload videos only after they register for an ac-
count and accept YouTube’s “Terms of Service” agreement. Id.; see About YouTube, supra 
note 17. The agreement provides that the user will not submit copyrighted material unless 
the user is the owner of such rights, has permission from the rightful owner to post the 
material, or is otherwise legally entitled to post the material. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 28; see 
About YouTube, supra note 17. 
19 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 28. 
20 See id. at 33; Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 10, Viacom, 676 F.3d 19 (No. 
10-3270), 2010 WL 4930315, at *10 (noting that YouTube’s lead project manager acknowl-
edged that “probably 75-80% of [YouTube’s] views” came from copyrighted material); 
Helman & Parchomovsky, supra note 17, at 1197–98 (noting the prevalence of user-posted 
material on Internet platforms like YouTube that, in many cases, occurs without permis-
sion from the copyright owner). 
21 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 26, 28. 
22 Id. at 28–29; see Bourne Co., http://www.bournemusic.com (last visited Mar. 15, 
2013). The named plaintiffs sued on behalf of a class of similarly situated copyright own-
ers. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants [Redacted Public Version] at 6, Viacom, 676 F.3d 19 (No. 
10-3342), 2010 WL 5066008, at *6. 
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action after finding the two suits sufficiently related.23 Both suits alleged 
direct and secondary copyright infringement,24 with the collective plain-
tiffs contending that approximately 79,000 audiovisual clips stored, dis-
played, and viewed on YouTube between 2005 and 2008 infringed their 
ownership of copyrighted material.25 The plaintiffs demanded statutory 
damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c), or, alternatively, actual damag-
es from the alleged infringement, as well as declaratory and injunctive 
relief.26 
 At the end of discovery, the parties cross-moved for partial sum-
mary judgment as to the applicability of YouTube’s § 512(c) safe harbor 
defense.27 The district court granted YouTube’s motion for summary 
judgment, finding that YouTube qualified for DMCA safe harbor pro-
tection as to all claims of direct and secondary copyright infringe-
ment.28 The district court reasoned that a service provider could not 
satisfy the § 512(c)(1)(B) control provision until it was aware of partic-
ular instances of copyright infringement.29 
 On appeal, in Viacom, the Second Circuit issued a unanimous two-
judge panel opinion, in various parts affirming, vacating, reversing, and 
remanding the district court’s ruling.30 The Second Circuit reversed 
                                                                                                                      
23 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 29. 
24 Id. at 26, 28–29. Secondary copyright liability comprises the doctrines of contributo-
ry, vicarious, and inducement liability. Id. at 28–29 & n.5. 
25 Id. at 26, 29. The year after Viacom filed suit, YouTube introduced “ContentID” —a 
system that proactively screens uploaded videos to determine whether they match a data-
base of copyrighted work. Peter S. Menell, Assessing the DMCA Safe Harbors: The Good, the 
Bad, and the Ugly, Media Inst. (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2010/ 
090110.php. The technology has substantially reduced the level of infringing content and 
the costs of policing for content owners. Id. The implementation of ContentID served as 
the basis for Viacom dropping its prospective relief requests and only pursuing its claims 
on YouTube activities from 2005 to 2008. See id. 
26 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 26, 29. Section 504(c) allows a copyright owner to elect to recov-
er statutory damages, instead of actual damages and profits, in a sum of not less than $750 
or more than $30,000 per copyright infringement claim, determined at the court’s discre-
tion. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006). 
27 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 29. The 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) safe harbor will shield a service pro-
vider from copyright liability only if the service provider satisfies its various provisions and, 
thus, identifies ways in which a provider might lose safe harbor protection. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); see also supra note 7 (listing the provisions of 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(c)(1)(A)–(C)). 
28 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 29; Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012). 
29 Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 527. 
30 Id. at 19, 25, 41–42. Senior Circuit Judge Roger J. Miner was originally assigned to 
the panel, but passed away prior to the resolution of the case. Id. at 25. The remaining two 
members of the panel were in agreement and were thus able to decide the case. Id. 
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the district court on its interpretation of § 512(c)(1)(B)31—one provi-
sion of the § 512(c) safe harbor—concluding that the lower court erred 
by requiring “item-specific” knowledge to trigger the “right and ability 
to control” infringing activity.32 Rather than impose a specific 
knowledge requirement as the district court had, the Second Circuit 
held that the § 512(c)(1)(B) control provision “requires something 
more than [YouTube’s] ability to remove or block access to materials 
posted on [its] website.”33 The court remanded the issue for the district 
court to conduct a fact-based inquiry to determine if YouTube pos-
sessed “something more” than simply the ability to remove or block ac-
cess to copyrighted material.34 
                                                                                                                      
31 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 26, 36–38. Section 512(c)(1)(B) provides: “A service provider 
shall not be liable . . . if the [] provider . . . does not receive a financial benefit directly 
attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right 
and ability to control such activity.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
32 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 26, 36–38; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B). 
33 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38. 
34 Id. at 36–38. There were two other main issues on appeal, neither of which is directly 
applicable to the focus of this Comment. See id. at 26, 30–35, 38–40. The first was the type of 
knowledge needed under § 512(c)(1)(A) to remove a service provider from the safe harbor. 
Id. at 26, 30–32; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A). The district court prefaced its analysis by noting 
that a jury could find that YouTube was not only generally aware of infringing material, but 
also welcomed such material on its site. Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 518. The district court 
concluded, however, that the “actual knowledge” or awareness of “facts or circumstances” 
that would disqualify an online service provider from safe harbor protection under 
§ 512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) refers to “knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements.” 
Id. at 523; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A). Agreeing with the district court, the Second Circuit 
held that removal from § 512(c) safe harbor requires knowledge or awareness of specific in-
fringing activity under § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii). Viacom, 676 F.3d at 26, 30–32; see 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(c)(1)(A). Nevertheless, the court vacated the district court’s order granting summary 
judgment on the issue, and remanded the matter because a reasonable jury could find that 
YouTube had actual knowledge or awareness of specific infringing activity on its website. 
Viacom, 676 F.3d at 26, 32–34. Moreover, on an issue of first impression, the court held that 
the plaintiffs could demonstrate the knowledge or awareness of specific instances of in-
fringement under § 512(c)(1)(A) by proving that the defendants were willfully blind under 
common law. Id. at 34–35; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A). 
The other issue was whether certain automated software functions of YouTube’s web-
site fell within § 512(c)(1). Viacom, 676 F.3d at 26, 38–40; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). The 
§ 512(c) safe harbor is only available when infringement occurs “by reason of the storage 
at the direction of a user.” Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). The district 
court held that all four of YouTube’s automated software functions—conversion of videos 
into a standard display format (“transcoding”), playback of videos on “watch” pages, a 
“related videos” function, and third-party syndication of videos uploaded—fell within the 
safe harbor for infringement that occurs “by reason of” user storage. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 
38–39; see Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 526. The district court noted that a contrary holding 
would “confine[] the word ‘storage’ too narrowly to meet the statute’s purpose.” Viacom, 
718 F. Supp. 2d at 526; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). The Second Circuit affirmed the district 
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II. Divergent Interpretations of the DMCA’s § 512(c)(1)(B) 
Control Provision 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s interpretation 
in Viacom of the § 512(c)(1)(B) control provision created a circuit split 
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2011 decision in 
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC.35 Although both cir-
cuits refused to read common law vicarious liability into § 512(c)(1)(B), 
they stated different standards for determining what constitutes the 
“right and ability to control” infringing material that would remove a 
service provider from DMCA § 512(c) safe harbor protection.36 The 
Ninth Circuit held that “something more” requires that a service pro-
vider has knowledge of specific instances of infringing material.37 Con-
versely, the Second Circuit held that “something more” requires that a 
service provider exert substantial influence over user activity, regardless 
of the service provider’s knowledge of particular infringing content.38 
 In Shelter Capital, the Ninth Circuit rejected the concept that ser-
vice providers have the “ability to control” infringing activity as long as 
they have the capability to locate infringing material and terminate us-
ers’ access.39 Moreover, the court rejected the notion that Veoh, a video-
sharing website similar to YouTube, should be subject to common law 
                                                                                                                      
court’s ruling on the first three software functions, but remanded for further fact finding 
as to the fourth function. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38–39. 
35 See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 37–38 (2d Cir. 2012); UMG Re-
cordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1041–45 (9th Cir. 2011); Jack 
C. Schecter, Is It Safe? The Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s “Safe Harbor” in the Wake of Via-
com v. YouTube, Fed. Law., Aug. 2012, at 16, 17, 23. 
36 See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 36–38; Shelter Capital, 667 F.3d at 1043–45; see 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(c)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). Vicarious liability is defined as “[l]iability that a 
supervisory party . . . bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate . . . 
based on the relationship between the two parties.” Black’s Law Dictionary 998 (9th ed. 
2009). The common law imposes vicarious liability for copyright infringement “[w]hen the 
right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct financial interest in the 
exploitation of copyrighted materials—even in the absence of actual knowledge.” Viacom, 
676 F.3d at 36 (quoting Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d 
Cir. 1963)); see Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Construction of Third-Party 
Copyright Liability, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1481, 1485–86 (2009). 
Neither the Viacom court nor the Shelter Capital court reached the question of whether 
YouTube or Veoh (the service provider defendant in Shelter Capital) received a financial bene-
fit directly attributable to the infringing activity—the second component of § 512(c)(1)(B) 
that plaintiffs must show is satisfied before a service provider can lose safe harbor protection. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B); Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38; Shelter Capital, 667 F.3d at 1041 n.15. 
37 See Shelter Capital, 667 F.3d at 1041–45. 
38 See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 36–38. 
39 Shelter Capital, 667 F.3d at 1042–43. 
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vicarious liability.40 As a result, the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary 
judgment for Veoh and held that the § 512(c) safe harbor protected 
Veoh from copyright liability.41 
 Rather than hinging the “ability to control” on a service provider’s 
capability, the Ninth Circuit concluded that service providers must be 
aware of specific infringing material to have the “ability to control” req-
uisite under § 512(c)(1)(B).42 The court reasoned that only then could 
a service provider’s control constitute the “something more” that could 
satisfy the § 512(c)(1)(B) control provision and trigger copyright liabil-
ity.43 Citing the district court’s holding in Viacom, the Ninth Circuit held 
that although a service provider may generally have the legal right and 
necessary technology to remove infringing content, it cannot exercise 
its “power of authority” over the material until it becomes aware of spe-
cific unauthorized material.44 
 In Viacom, the Second Circuit began its § 512(c)(1)(B) control pro-
vision analysis by rejecting the reasoning of the district court in Viacom 
and the Ninth Circuit in Shelter Capital.45 The court reasoned that read-
ing a specific knowledge requirement into the § 512(c)(1)(B) control 
provision would render the provision duplicative of § 512(c)(1)(A).46 
Specifically, any service provider that had item-specific knowledge of 
infringing activity would already be excluded from the safe harbor for 
having specific knowledge of infringing material and failing to effect 
expeditious removal under § 512(c)(1)(A).47 Therefore, § 512(c)(1)(B) 
                                                                                                                      
40 Id. at 1043–45. Discussing Congress’s intentions in enacting the safe harbor provi-
sion, the court noted that “§ 512(c) nowhere mentions the term ‘vicarious liability.’” Id. at 
1043. Moreover, the court stated that, “although not definitive, the legislative history in-
forms our conclusion that Congress did not intend to exclude from § 512(c)’s safe harbor 
all service providers who would be vicariously liable for their users’ infringing activity un-
der the common law.” Id. at 1044. As a result, the court concluded that 
Given Congress’ explicit intention to protect qualifying service providers who 
would otherwise be subject to vicarious liability, it would be puzzling for Con-
gress to make § 512(c) entirely coextensive with the vicarious liability require-
ments, which would effectively exclude all vicarious liability claims from the 
§ 512(c) safe harbor. 
Id. 
41 Id. at 1026. 
42 Id. at 1042; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
43 Shelter Capital, 667 F.3d at 1042–43. 
44 Id. at 1041–42; see Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012). 
45 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 36; see Shelter Capital, 667 F.3d at 1041–42; Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d 
at 527. 
46 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 36; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
47 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 36. 
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would fail to exclude any service provider from the safe harbor that was 
not already excluded by § 512(c)(1)(A).48 
 The Second Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs’ interpretation of 
the § 512(c)(1)(B) control provision, which contended that the pro-
vision codified the common law doctrine of vicarious liability.49 The 
court noted that to impose common law vicarious liability in the 
DMCA context would render the statute internally inconsistent be-
cause the prerequisite to liability protection under § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) 
and § 512(c)(1)(C) would simultaneously be a disqualifier under 
§ 512(c)(1)(B).50 Moreover, the court stated that had Congress intend-
ed § 512(c)(1)(B) to be coextensive with vicarious liability, it could 
have said so explicitly.51 Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that the 
“foregoing tension” was sufficient to hold that the control provision 
“dictate[d]” a departure from the common law vicarious liability stand-
ard.52 
 Accordingly, the court held that the “right and ability to control” 
infringing activity under § 512(c)(1)(B) “requires something more” 
than just the ability to remove or block access to materials posted to a 
service provider’s website.53 The Second Circuit then attempted to de-
fine “something more.”54 The court determined that a service provider 
must “exert[] substantial influence” on its users’ activities, but does not 
need to acquire actual knowledge of specific instances of infringe-
ment.55 As such, the court’s ruling makes it comparatively harder for a 
                                                                                                                      
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 36–38. 
50 Id. at 37; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). The court explained: 
Section 512(c) actually presumes that service providers have the ability to 
“block . . . access” to infringing material. Indeed, a service provider who has 
knowledge or awareness of infringing material or who receives a takedown 
notice . . . is required to “remove, or disable access to, the material” in order to 
claim the benefit of the safe harbor. . . . [I]n taking such action, the service 
provider would . . . be admitting the “right and ability to control.” 
Viacom, 676 F.3d at 37 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
51 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 37. 
52 Id. at 37–38. 
53 Id. at 38; accord Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 724, 747–48 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d. 1090, 1109–10 (W.D. 
Wash. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 
F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010); Hendrickson v. eBay Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1093–94 (C.D. 
Cal. 2001). 
54 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38. 
55 See id. The court gave two examples of influence that would rise to the level of con-
trol required by § 512(c)(1)(B). Id. First, the court cited the 2002 case, Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Cybernet Ventures, Inc., in which the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California 
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service provider to retain safe harbor protection.56 Rather than estab-
lish a rigid, specific analytical test, the court remanded the issue for the 
district court to determine factually whether YouTube exerted such a 
substantial influence on the activities of its users.57 
III. Viacom’s Statutory Interpretation Furthers the  
Policies Behind the DMCA 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s interpretation 
of the § 512(c)(1)(B) control provision in Viacom is preferable to the 
interpretation used by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
the 2011 case, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC.58 The 
Second Circuit’s Viacom holding not only rendered the statute internally 
consistent statute by giving effect to all of its language, but also fur-
thered the broad policy goals behind the DMCA.59 Additionally, the 
court provided lower courts with general guidelines and examples by 
which to determine whether a defendant’s conduct satisfies the 
§ 512(c)(1)(B) control provision.60 The result will be predictable out-
comes that better reflect the DMCA’s goal to balance the interests of, 
and provide certainty to, copyright owners and service providers.61 In 
                                                                                                                      
found that a service provider had the requisite control after it instituted a monitoring 
program that provided its user websites with “detailed instructions regard[ing] issues of 
layout, appearance, and content.” 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1173–74 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Second, 
citing the 2005 U.S. Supreme Court case, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, the 
court noted that “inducement of copyright infringement . . . which ‘premises liability on 
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct,’ might also rise to the level of control under 
§ 512(c)(1)(B).” Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)). The court also identified two cases in which control 
was not found; in those cases, the service providers were not involved in listing items for 
sale on their websites, nor did they preview, edit, or suggest prices. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38 
n.13; see Corbis Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1109–10; Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1093–94. 
56 See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38. 
57 Id. 
58 See infra notes 59–76 and accompanying text. 
59 See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27, 36–38 (2d Cir. 2012); H.R. 
Rep. No. 105-796, at 72–73 (1998) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 639, 649; 
H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49–50 (1998); S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 2, 8, 20, 40 (1998). 
60 See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38. One commentator disagrees. See Schecter, supra note 35, 
at 17 (arguing that although the Second Circuit’s examples are somewhat helpful, the 
court “avoided an opportunity to provide some much needed clarity,” and, by and large, 
passed on the question of how to define the “something more” required). 
61 See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38; S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8, 20, 40. Several commentators have 
criticized the DMCA as outdated and illogical in today’s Web 2.0 environment. See, e.g., 
Helman & Parchomovsky, supra note 17, at 1194, 1196–97, 1217 (proposing a “radical 
change” in webhosts’ copyright liability for illegal content posted by users in which webhosts 
that employ the “best filtering technology” available on the market would be immune from 
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contrast, by requiring specific knowledge of infringing material to satisfy 
the § 512(c)(1)(B) control provision, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Shelter 
Capital failed to effect an internally consistent statute or to further 
broader DMCA policy goals.62 As such, other circuit courts should reject 
the Ninth Circuit’s approach and adopt the Second Circuit’s standard 
for satisfying the § 512(c)(1)(B) control provision.63 
 The Second Circuit correctly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s flawed 
reading of § 512(c)(1)(B), and instead interpreted the control provi-
sion in a way that rendered the statute internally consistent and gave 
meaning to all of its provisions.64 Courts should interpret a statute such 
that all of its language, if possible, is given effect.65 Indeed, both courts 
cited the proposition that statutory interpretations that render lan-
guage superfluous are disfavored.66 Thus, the Second Circuit correctly 
determined that the Ninth Circuit erred by holding that a service pro-
vider must have specific knowledge of infringing material to have the 
“ability to control,” as that reading would render the control provision 
duplicative of earlier statutory text.67 Furthermore, had the Second 
Circuit followed the plaintiffs’ reading of the control provision and 
held that the “ability to control” was a codification of common law vi-
                                                                                                                      
liability); Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts 233, 234–35, 
260–69 (2009) (arguing that much uncertainty and confusion exists around the decade-old 
DMCA safe harbors, and providing five principles for Congress to consider in amending the 
safe harbors); Brandon Brown, Note, Fortifying the Safe Harbors: Reevaluating the DMCA in a Web 
2.0 World, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 437, 438, 463–67 (2008) (arguing that Congress originally 
set up a binary system to shift the burden of policing infringing material to the least-cost-
avoider—the copyright owner—but that in a Web 2.0 world, a balancing test should be im-
plemented to allow for an economical and just balance of the burden for policing copyright 
infringement). This Comment takes no position on the argument, but acknowledges the 
common refrain. See infra notes 62–76 and accompanying text. 
62 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1041–42 
(9th Cir. 2011); H.R. Rep. No. 105-796, at 72–73 (Conf. Rep.); H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 
2, at 49–50; S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 2, 8, 20, 40. 
63 See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38; Shelter Capital, 667 F.3d at 1041–45. 
64 See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 36–38; Shelter Capital, 667 F.3d at 1041–42. 
65 TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 
(2001); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955). 
66 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 36; Shelter Capital, 667 F.3d at 1041. 
67 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); Viacom, 676 F.3d at 36. By interpret-
ing § 512(c)(1)(B) to require a service provider to expeditiously remove material if it has 
specific knowledge of infringement, the Ninth Circuit renders § 512(c)(1)(B) irrelevant 
and superfluous, because such a service provider would already be required to do so un-
der § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (iii). Viacom, 676 F.3d at 36; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
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carious liability, the result would have been an internally inconsistent 
statute.68 
 Moreover, the Second Circuit’s ruling furthers the policies behind 
the DMCA.69 Instead of undertaking a wholesale clarification of existing 
third-party liability, Congress chose to create a series of safe harbors to 
protect service providers’ common activities from liability for direct, vi-
carious, and contributory infringement.70 In so doing, Congress aimed 
to ensure that innocent service providers, in the normal course of their 
operations, were not exposed to potentially debilitating copyright in-
fringement liability.71 The Second Circuit’s reading of § 512(c)(1)(B) in 
Viacom ensures that a service provider that simply stores material at its 
users’ direction will fall within the safe harbor and remain protected 
from liability.72 At the same time, a service provider will forfeit safe har-
bor protection if it can be proven that the provider “exert[ed] substan-
tial influence” over the activities of its users and essentially became an 
active participant, whether or not it knew of specific instances of in-
fringement.73 Therefore, the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the 
§ 512(c)(1)(B) control provision prevents service providers that influ-
ence their users’ activities from hiding behind protections meant for 
innocent service providers who do not do so.74 This interpretation is 
consistent with Congress’s goal to provide certainty to both copyright 
                                                                                                                      
68 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 37; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). The court reasoned that § 512(c) begins 
with a presumption that service providers have the ability to block access to infringing mate-
rial, and, in fact, that § 512(c)(1)(A) requires service providers that know of infringement to 
take down the offending material. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 37. As such, if the court interpreted the 
§ 512(c)(1)(B) control provision to codify common law vicarious liability standards and the 
service provider took action after receiving a takedown notice under § 512(c)(1)(A), the 
provider would end up in a “catch22” where liability would be inevitable. Id. at 37–38; see 17 
U.S.C. § 512(c). Therefore, the court correctly held that § 512(c)(1)(B) dictated a departure 
from common law vicarious liability. See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 37–38. 
69 See id. at 27, 36–38; H.R. Rep. No. 105-796, at 72–73 (1998) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 
1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 639, 649; H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49–50 (1998); S. Rep. No. 105-
190, at 2, 8, 20, 40 (1998). 
70 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 27; H.R. Rep. No. 105-796, at 73 (Conf. Rep.); H.R. Rep. No. 105-
551, pt. 2, at 50; S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 19–20; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d). 
71 See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8 (“In the ordinary course of their operations service 
providers must engage in all kinds of acts that expose them to potential copyright in-
fringement liability.”). Specifically, the § 512(c) safe harbor was meant to ensure that pro-
viders that simply stored material at the direction of their users were not liable for vicari-
ous liability. See id. 
72 See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. 
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owners and service providers.75 Moving forward, service providers can 
structure their operations with the certainty that they will remain eligi-
ble for safe harbor protection under § 512(c)(1)(B) as long as they do 
not substantially direct or influence the activities of their users.76 
Conclusion 
 The Second and Ninth Circuits are the only circuits to date to have 
interpreted the § 512(c)(1)(B) control provision. The Second Circuit’s 
analysis of the control provision in Viacom caused a circuit split with the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding in Shelter Capital. The Ninth Circuit held that 
the “something more” required to trigger the control provision and 
potentially remove a service provider from safe harbor protection is 
satisfied only when the service provider becomes aware of specific un-
authorized material and can exercise its “power of authority” over the 
material. In contrast, the Second Circuit held that “something more” is 
satisfied when a service provider “exert[s] substantial influence” over 
the activities of users, regardless of whether the service provider has 
actual knowledge of specific instances of infringement. 
 The Second Circuit’s holding in Viacom correctly rejected the 
Ninth Circuit’s flawed interpretation of the § 512(c)(1)(B) control 
provision to produce an internally consistent statute that gave effect to 
all of its language. Moreover, the Second Circuit provided lower courts 
with helpful guidelines for analyzing whether a defendant’s conduct 
satisfies § 512(c)(1)(B). This holding will lead to predictable outcomes 
that better reflect the DMCA’s goal of balancing the interests of copy-
right owners and service providers, and providing both parties certain-
ty. To promote this predictability around the country, other circuit 
                                                                                                                      
75 See id. at 27; H.R. Rep. No. 105-796, at 72 (Conf. Rep.); H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, 
at 49–50; S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 2, 8, 20, 40. 
76 See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38; see also Lee, supra note 61, at 262 & n.126 (arguing that 
the DMCA safe harbors should be interpreted to promote clarity for private planning and 
that courts should articulate steps that service providers can take to fall within the § 512(c) 
safe harbor); Nick Morgan, Viacom v. YouTube and the Future of Service Provider Liability for 
User Infringements of Copyright, Comm. Law., Nov. 2012, at 1, 32 (reading the control provi-
sion to prohibit service providers from prescreening, reviewing, or rejecting user uploads, 
imposing quality control standards, or otherwise taking an active role in culling or shaping 
user-submitted content); Schecter, supra note 35, at 23 (positing that as long as a service 
provider is not purposefully and actively dictating the content of its users, it seems unlikely 
that it would forfeit safe harbor protection by reason of the control provision). On re-
mand, the district court will need to address this question: was YouTube simply storing 
user material as it was uploaded to the site, or was it influencing the activities and decisions 
of its users? See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38. 
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courts should adopt the Second Circuit’s standard for satisfying the 
§ 512(c)(1)(B) control provision. 
Brett M. Jackson 
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